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1. The Neo-Brentanists   
  Franz Brentano was not a solitary figure who propounded his philosophy in lonely 
isolation from other contemporary philosophers in Germany, as some neo-Brentanists have 
claimed over the last thirty to forty years. The aim in what follows is to correct such 
misconceptions by establishing that Brentano developed his philosophical psychology while 
actively engaged in the rich intellectual-historical and academic context of his time—in 
particular, under the influence of Hermann Lotze.   
  The misleading image of Brentano as a solitary genius promulgated by the likes of 
Neo-Brentanists such as Barry Smith is analogous to the picture of Gottlob Frege passed off 
as historical truth by influential Neo-Fregeans—Michael Dummett, for one. In both cases, we 
find a distinguished thinker portrayed as the reclusive, solitary man of genius. Thanks, 
however, to the researches of Hans Sluga, Gottfried Gabriel, and others, we now know that in 
the case of Frege it was as an active player in the culture of nineteenth-century German 
philosophy that he propounded the innovations in symbolic logic for which he is famous. The 
same holds for Franz Brentano and the introduction of his philosophical psychology, as we 
shall see presently by probing and assessing the historical, epistolary, and textual evidence. 
  As opposed to the image of the neo-Brentanists, Brentano in no way saw himself as an 
intellectually and institutionally isolated thinker, and he certainly never represented himself as 
such. In perhaps his most important work, Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, 
Brentano admitted that “his view, at least from one side or the other, had already begun” to be 
developed by other authors before him (1874, 4). Moreover, Brentano explicitly refers to John 
Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz, and above 
all Hermann Lotze—each a near contemporary of Brentano—as thinkers to whom he owed 
his greatest intellectual debts (1874, 3).  
  In fact, Brentano regularly took up and critiqued the doctrines advanced by the 
philosophers of his time, both German and more widely European. It is not the case, however, 
as is too often asserted, that he limited contact to empiricists and positivists (such as Auguste 
Comte). This is clear from the fact, for example, that when he traveled to Great Britain in the 
spring of 1872 he not only planned to pay a visit to J. S. Mill (the visit didn’t take place 
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because of Mill’s unexpected death) but also met with the leading evolutionary theorist and 
political liberal of the period, Herbert Spencer. What’s more, beyond being actively engaged 
with the broad range of the latest philosophical thinking, Brentano was also a serious, life-
long student of scholastic and classical philosophy.  
  That the roots of Brentano’s “revolution in philosophy” strike more deeply than 
commonly recognized in the philosophical currents of his day is further evidenced by what he 
took for granted in his writings. This is most notably seen when spelling out the ways his 
positions on various topics related to the views of leading nineteenth-century German 
philosophers whose doctrines were so widely familiar in the literature of the time that he felt it 
unnecessary to identify them by name. A telling example is Jakob Friedrich Fries, who 
anticipated Brentano’s rejection of the widely held notion that perception consists in a 
combination of ideas. Fries also anticipated Brentano by identifying “assertions” with 
perception, a consequential epistemological move that Alfred Kastil (1912, 52 f.) first pointed 
out over a century ago, and one we shall take up in due course (in § 3.1). It was evidently 
Lotze who was the medium of Fries’s influence on Brentano on this head.  Such shared 
thought-determinations and theoretical outlooks attests to how interrelated were the various 
currents of nineteenth-century German philosophy, multiple lines of influence that enabled 
Kastil, who edited three volumes of Brentano’s writings (1921, 1925, 1933), to trace a variety 
of similarities between Fries and Brentano, findings he presented in the pages of the neo-
Friesian journal Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, New Series.  
  
2. An overview of the relationship between Lotze and Brentano   
  Turning directly to the relationship between Lotze and Brentano, one reads in a recent 
assessment that between the two philosophers, “there was, to be sure, great mutual respect … 
as indicated by the fact that Brentano sent two of his pupils, Anton Marty and Carl Stumpf, to 
study with Lotze, and also by the fact that Lotze played an important role in Brentano’s call at 
the University of Vienna in 1874.”1  Despite the impression that these particulars may convey, 
however, one hardly finds anything like a symmetry in the relationship between Lotze and 
Brentano. While Lotze certainly admired the younger man, he regarded him as merely one of 
an entire cohort of rising figures in German philosophy whose professional advancement he, 
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Lotze, felt merited his advocacy. It is true that Lotze formally endorsed Brentano’s effort to 
secure an appointment as a professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna. However, one 
should not read too much into this token of support on Lotze’s part. Brentano simply met the 
intellectual criteria that prompted Lotze to support the professional advancement of young 
philosophers with whom he was personally acquainted. Julius Baumann, Lotze’s younger 
colleague in Göttingen, enumerated Lotze’s criteria: “Has the person the knowledge that is to 
be presupposed in philosophy today, does he also have a command of the scientific methods, 
and is he deadly serious in his philosophical interests? On the basis of these criteria, he has, 
for example, recommended Brentano for Vienna.” (Baumann 1909, 179)  
Lotze’s estimate of Brentano was confirmed in person when, in June 1872, Brentano 
and Carl Stumpf called upon Lotze at his home near Göttingen. The eminent professor’s 
residence was dubbed “The Coffee Grinder” by the students and professional colleagues who 
gathered there on a regular basis. “Lotze was friendly,” Stumpf recalled decades later, “but 
silent, as so often” (1901, 125).  
In sum, it is clear that while Brentano benefited a good deal both intellectually and 
professionally from his knowledge of and interaction with Lotze, the same could hardly be 
said for the by-then long established and internationally renowned figure in the German 
philosophical pantheon of the era. Indeed, twenty-one years Brentano’s senior, Lotze saw 
through to publication the third and final volume of his monumental and widely acclaimed 
Mikrokosmos in 1864, two years before Brentano had even secured his venia legendi (the 
habilitation).    
  Lotze’s influence on Brentano has previously been remarked, if briefly, in the 
literature. Three decades ago, Ernst Wolfgang Orth identified Trendelenburg and  
Lotze as Brentano’s “teachers.” As Orth put it, “Brentano’s philosophical significance 
consists in that he made the strength of this influence paradigmatically clear in the entire 
spectrum of its aspects” (Orth 1997, 18). It is not surprising that Brentano would have learned 
much from Trendelenburg, having studied with Trendelenburg in Berlin. Among other 
evidence of Trendelenburg’s influence is Brentano’s deep and abiding interest in Aristotle, 
something reflected in the latter’s doctoral dissertation on Aristotle (1862). This was 
Brentano’s first publication and he dedicated it to Trendelenburg.  
But there is also no mystery to how Lotze at Göttingen could prove a shaping 
influenced on Brentano during the latter’s formative period. The young Brentano read widely 
and deeply, both in the German thinkers of his age and in ancient, medieval, and modern 
Western European authors. Hence early on in his philosophical career Brentano found that, 
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despite “some mistakes” (charges of Brentano we consider in the sequel), Lotze was 
unquestionably, in his view, the most brilliant contemporary German philosopher. “Lotze will 
always show himself to be the most important thinker that he indisputably is,” Brentano 
would write to his former student and close friend Carl Stumpf on June 6, 1868 (Kaiser-el-
Safti 2014, p. 16). Indeed, Brentano came to regard Lotze above his Berlin mentor, 
Trendelenburg.  
  It was Stumpf who cultivated the contact between his two philosophical masters, 
Lotze and Brentano. Stumpf had earned his doctorate under Lotze’s supervision in Göttingen 
in 1868, and received his venia legendi under him in 1870. Between 1870 and 1873, Stumpf 
was a lecturer (Privatdozent) at the University of Göttingen, during which years Lotze became 
for him a “faithful fatherly adviser” (1917, 5). It is not surprising, then, that it was to Lotze 
that Stumpf dedicated his first book, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der 
Raumvorstellung (1873), a work that would receive high praise by the likes of William James 
and Bertrand Russell. Indeed, Lotze and his student and soon-to-be colleague were on such 
close terms that during the summer holidays of 1869, Lotze had considered traveling out to 
spend time with Stumpf (and Brentano) at Würzburg or in Aschaffenburg (Lotze 2003, 541). 
 Like Stumpf, Brentano, we’ve noted, greatly admired Lotze, but his respect went 
beyond adulation and the promotion of Lotze’s thought. In the winter of 1870–71, Brentano 
initiated a campaign to recruit Lotze for a professorship in philosophy in Würzburg (Kaiserel-
Safti 2014, 28 f., October 29, 1870), an offer Lotze declined. Of genuine import for the 
history of philosophy, however, is that during that period Brentano steeped himself in Lotze’s 
writings while working on Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano’s magnum 
opus. We find clear evidence of this in a letter to Carl Stumpf dated June 8, 1871:  
  
These days I have read a lot of Lotze, and some passages not without joy and admiration. 
The Mikrokosmos, First Volume, Second Book [Die Seele], contains excellent thoughts; 
especially his argument against the Herbartians is masterly.
2
 In fact, I do not regret the 
praise given to him at the end of my first lectures [in Wurzburg].
3
 (Ibid. 48)  
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 See Brentano (1874, 113).  
3
 At that time, Brentano had encouraged Carl Stumpf, who attended those first lectures, to study with Lotze; cf., 
the letter dated March 11,1867, below.   
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  That Lotze’s early magnum opus was an animating component of Brentano’s thinking 
as Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint took shape is manifest in the passages from 
Mikrokosmos that Brentano quotes at several key points and at greater length than he does the 
work of any other author.
4
  
    
3. Relatedness    
  As Stumpf would ultimately put it, “Lotze’s views [agreed] with those of Brentano 
only very partially.” (1919, 102) This is borne out in a missive Stumpf received from 
Brentano a half century earlier. The purpose of the note, dated November 11, 1867, was to 
explain why Brentano had sent him to study with Lotze: because, said Brentano, “[I] couldn’t 
name any other professor of philosophy [other than Lotze] whose teachings I don’t consider to 
be erroneous, and because Lotze is excellent in many ways, in spite of all his failures” 
(Kaiser-el-Safti 2014, 2).  
 Notwithstanding the highly qualified cast of the foregoing statements, they are 
consistent with a demonstrable measure of significant, if limited overlap in the positions of 
Lotze and Brentano. Just how significant will become clear presently as we trace the 
following cardinal points of convergence: the content of judgment (§3.1), the content of 
perception (§3.2), the concept of intentionality (§3.3), the practice of descriptive psychology 
(§3.4) and the claim that perception is accompanied by judgment (knowledge) and emotion 
(§3.5). Touching these shared views, it is essential to set the record straight, for a number of 
influential commentators have unwarrantably given out that it was Brentano who first 
introduced (or reintroduced) to nineteenth-century German philosophy various of the notions 
to which, as their writings attest, both he and Lotze subscribed. While it is true that Lotze 
mooted them in somewhat different form, the credit unquestionably belongs to him for first 
contributing to German philosophical literature penetrating and systematic treatments of them 
decades before Brentano.  
 Beyond the seminal points of convergence just enumerated, Lotze and Brentano 
advanced similar philosophical programs on at least two additional fronts, one seen in their 
effort to recast and pursue philosophy as a strict science, and the other in their move to 
introduce a stepwise or, “piecemeal,” approach to the prosecution of systematic philosophy. 
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On both these methodological scores, just as with the five more circumscribed moments of 
convergence, Brentano followed Lotze’s lead.   
  
3.1. Judgment and its content  
 The concepts of judgment and its content play a formative role in Lotze’s logic and 
they do so in Brentano’s as well. The first to call attention this shared element in Lotze and 
Brentano was Georg Misch, Wilhelm Dilthey’s student (and son-in-law). Misch found that 
Brentano “agrees with Lotze’s later doctrine on the main point that judgment—and value 
judgment, treated [by him] in parallel—are related to reality through matter-of-factness 
[Sachlichkeit]” (Misch 1912, xvii n.).  
  Lotze held that judgment is not the result of any “association of ideas,” taking issue 
here not only with the British empiricists Hume and Mill, but also with Johann Friedrich 
Herbart.
5
 Rejecting the philosophical psychology of these thinkers, Lotze argued that 
judgment is not a reciprocal relation of ideas but is rather the affirmation of a reciprocal 
relation of objective content, or of things. Put otherwise, a judgment asserts a state of affairs.
6
 
The content of a judgment manifests, in Lotze’s view, the structure of the minimal ontological 
interrelation that obtains among objects (things).
7
  Lotze understood this to be the defining 
moment of a judgment, what makes a judgment a judgment. The element of affirmation is 
what differentiates judgments from mere series (complexes) of concepts, and from questions.
8
  
 Brentano adopted Lotze’s conception of the priority of judgment. He reflects that 
standpoint when declares that, “in judging, to a simple idea, a second, fundamentally different 
relation of consciousness to the object comes to the fore,”9 namely that the idea is true.10 In 
other words we affirm, or assert, the idea.   
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7
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“assertoric” character of a judgment. 
8
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 See Brentano (1924b, 39).  
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  Brentano, however, did not espouse Lotze’s concept of the “state of affairs” as the 
content of judgments
11
 (although Carl Stumpf, whom as we’ve noted studied first with 
Brentano and subsequently with Lotze, eventually did so). That said, Brentano expressly 
rejected the precept of the old Aristotelian logic that judgments put a subject and predicate 
together as one concept. Here Brentano concurred with Lotze; more precisely, he seconded 
Lotze’s highly consequential insistence that concepts are functions, not complexes of subject 
and predicate.  
  
3.2. The content of perception  
  Although Lotze criticized Herbart’s logic, he adopted his epistemological doctrine that 
the content of perception is the given. Lotze characterized the given as a lived entertainment 
[erleben] of the “content of perception.” And he categorially distinguished the content of 
perception from the content of judgment. The given, for Lotze, thus stands opposed, on one 
hand, to events and facts (which is to say, what happens) and, on the other, to judgments, 
namely to that whose determinate character is a function of validity. Unequivocally 
differentiating in this manner events and facts from judgments, Lotze derives from the 
ontological difference that sets happenings apart from validities a fundamental metaphysical 
distinction between genesis and being, between “happens” and “is.”  
 To appreciate the ground-breaking and highly influential nature of Lotze’s non-
representational epistemology here, one may turn, for example, to Oskar Kraus, who called 
attention to the manifest similarities in the epistemologies of Brentano, Johannes Rehmke, and 
Hans Driesch – all three of whom eschewed the representative (Abbild) theory of perception. 
What’s more, like Lotze they each subscribed to the view that we have direct access to the 
outside world. That the three thinkers hardly exhibit complete agreement, however, is clear 
respecting, for example, the Lotzean notion of “the content” of perception. Brentano inherited 
from Lotze this way of conceiving acts of perception as having “content,” whereas Rehmke 
and Driesch, who evinced little interest in Lotze’s writings, did not.  
 Among other things, Lotze’s position that the content of perception is “the given” is 
no less than the origin, still little-recognized, of the classic modern philosophical concept of 
“sense-data,” which historically has been assumed to be an innovation of Anglophone 
                                                 
11
 To be more exact, Brentano claimed, as Frege later did, that the content of a judgment is an object. See on this 
Chrudzimski (2004).  
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philosophers. However, it was Lotze’s lectures in metaphysics that inspired Josiah Royce to 
formulated the notion.
12
 A short time later “sense-data” acquired currency in the thought and 
writings of William James who like his close friend and Harvard colleague, Royce, nurtured 
the highest respect for Lotze. Ultimately, however, “sense-data” as a foundational 
epistemological notion was to receive its greatest impetus in the widely influential early work 
of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, the founding fathers of analytical philosophy (see 
Milkov 2001). This lineage of a historically formative twentieth-century epistemological 
concept is but one of numerous examples of how Lotze’s thought, a catalytic element in 
Brentano’s development and independent philosophical contributions, proved seminal in 
currents of philosophical thinking that otherwise have little in common with Brentano.  
  Brentano introduced a phenomenology that builds upon Lotze’s view that the acts of 
perception have specific content. What distinguishes Brentano’s position from that of Lotze in 
this connection is the distinction Brentano draws between inner and outer experience. The 
phenomena of Brentano’s phenomenology have their being in our inner experience alone, 
which he regarded as ontologically discrete from outer experience. Phenomena exist, in other 
words, only in our mind and not in the external world, our contact with the latter occurring by 
way of outer experience.  
  This account of Brentano’s exhibits only a distant kinship to Lotze’s epistemology. 
Following Kant, Lotze championed the view that we can acquire empirical knowledge only 
through the idealities that belong to the mentally given, not to material reality. But idealities 
require matter in order to appear at all. That is why they inhere only in our sensible life, as for 
instance in empirically keyed feelings of pleasure and displeasure.
13
 This explains why we 
have no a priori idea of blue, for example, or of sweet.
14
 We know qualia exclusively in 
empirical experience.   
    
3.3. Intentionality  
  A most significant but historically ignored or overlooked fact is that it was Hermann 
Lotze who laid the groundwork for Brentano’s signature contribution to philosophy: the 
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reintroduction of the notion of intentionality. Recently, Frederick Beiser briefly noted that 
along with his famed distinction between validity and reality, Lotze had also discriminated 
between intentionality and existence.
15
 Some two decades before Beiser, Ernst Wolfgang Orth 
published a more detailed analysis of Lotze’s thinking on this head. Orth pointed out that, 
together with Adolf Trendelenburg, Lotze set the stage for Brentano’s (re)introduction of the 
notion of intentionality when he articulated the idea of evolving consciousness in philosophy. 
Moreover, Orth rightly recognized as “decisive” the “thesis” that Trendelenburg and Lotze 
defended “the absolute incomparability of mental with physical phenomena16 and of the 
primacy of the mental phenomena over the physical” (Orth 1997, 24).  
Lotze’s view that mental acts have a content proved a powerful impetus to Brentano’s 
move to reintroduce the problem of intentionality in the modern philosophical curriculum. 
The Lotzean influence is apparent in the way Brentano initially presented that concept, not 
even employing the term “intentionality” as such, but speaking instead of the “reference to a 
content” (see Poli 1998, 4):  
  
Every mental phenomenon is characterized … by what we will call … the relation to a 
content, the direction toward an object, ... or the immanent objectivity 
[Gegenständlichkeit]. (1874, 124–5)  
  
 By way of concluding this phase of discussion, we may adduce Paul Linke’s remark of 
well over half a century ago that Gottlob Frege discovered “on his own” (i.e., independently 
of Brentano) the intentional relation of consciousness—this from the standpoint of “the lived 
experience [Erlebnis] of logical thinking” (1961, p. 55), a theme that held little interest for 
Brentano. Frege contended namely that the sense of propositions is something that we livingly 
grasp. Pace Linke, though, Frege, like Brentano before him, derived the notion of 
intentionality from Hermann Lotze. In sum, Brentano and Frege, both former students of 
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 Significantly, the categorical distinction between mental and physical phenomena is a central thesis of 
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Lotze, each co-opted and in his own way further developed Lotze’s originary line of thinking 




3.4. Descriptive psychology  
  Over a period of decades, Lotze addressed various problems of descriptive 
psychology, which Brentano and his followers made their special field. To distinguish the 
character of descriptive psychology in this context is to disclose pivotal yet rarely discussed 
continuities in the thinking of the two philosophers.   
  Brentano insisted that we need first to describe phenomena before we are in a position 
to explain them, or to pursue genetic psychology in general. It is in this regard that Lotze’s 
analysis of the content of mind constitutes a form of descriptive psychology.
18
 A defining 
philosophical-historical fact to be aware of relative to Brentano’s most influential contribution 
to modern speculative thought here is that it was Lotze who introduced the very distinction 
between genetic and descriptive psychology. As previously noted (in § 3.2), Lotze drew a 
categorical distinction between the given, or what is, from what happens, i.e., what changes. 
Correlative with this ontologically pregnant distinction, Lotze introduced and discussed at 
length the distinction between the character of that which is genetic and the nature of 
validities. What descriptive psychology yields are simply validities and not explanatory, 
genetic accounts of psychic phenomena.  
Further, and most germane to modern psychology, Lotze employs of the phrase “the soul” 
throughout his writings as a term of art: “a phenomenological expression that summarizes a 
series of phenomena.”19 He repudiated views of the psyche that define it as an individual or as 
a substance. To lift a trope derived from Lotze, one made famous by his acolyte William 
James, “the soul” is, to Lotze’s way of thinking, a “stream of consciousness” constituting 
nothing but a discrete series of phenomena. Such unity as the soul manifests is no other than a 
matter of superimposed form. That is why it makes no sense to delimit what “soul” denotes in 
philosophical psychology to a single configuration of psychic phenomena. Hence one 
properly approaches the variety of psychic phenomena only by taking a strictly descriptive 
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route, which is precisely the methodology that Lotze had in mind when he employed the term 
“descriptive psychology.”20  
  
3.5. Perception, knowledge, and emotions  
  Brentano found deeply persuasive Lotze’s observation that a feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure attaches to every idea (Vorstellung).
21
 It was just this discerning perception that 
led Lotze to find in the concept of “values” a core principle of epistemology.  22  
  (An historically seminal if little remarked current of interest sparked by Lotze’s value-
epistemology, which he first worked out in his Mikrokosmos, is seen in psychoanalytic 
thinking of the early twentieth century. One of the fathers of psychoanalysis, Sandor Ferenczi, 
an early member of Freud’s inner circle, declared that “this idea of Lotze’s agrees with ideas 
of psychoanalysis that were achieved through empirical ways to such an extent that we can 
consider him … as a predecessor of Freud.”23)  
   Another of Lotze’s epistemological findings that Brentano took as a point of departure 
for his own investigation is that judgments (i.e., knowledge) accompany mental acts.
24
 Lotze 
for his part maintained that perception—including that which distinguishes cognition in 
imagining, dreaming, and daydreaming—presents not only a “kaleidoscope” of pictures 
(Bilder).
25
 It also manifests “secondary thoughts” (Nebengedanken) that connect such of the 
perceived images as intrinsically belong together.
26
 Lotze understood this nebengedankenliche 
relation or synthesis of perceptual Bilder to be the process by means of which we acquire 
knowledge.   
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 Indeed, it is precisely in this connection that Brentano twice adduced the above-cited (cf., § 2) extended 
passages from Lotze’s Mikrokosmos in three consecutive pages in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.   
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 Cf. Brentano (1924b, 93).  
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 Cf. S. Ferenczi: “Aus der Psychologie von Lotze,” Imago. Zeitschrift für Anwendungen der Psychoanalyse auf 
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 Cf. Lotze 1843, 72.  
26
 Cf. Milkov 2002. 
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4. Agreements  
Besides the multiple points of convergence that we’ve traced in Lotze and Brentano—a 
shared constellation of thought-determinations that testifies to Brentano’s profound debt to his 
senior colleague—there are at least two further, methodological aspects of their doctrines that 
reflect a still deeper meeting of the minds in their most influential work.  
   
4.1. Philosophy as a strict science  
  Lotze and Brentano shared the aim of establishing philosophy as a strict science.  
Brentano pursued this end in terms of an empirical scientific philosophical psychology: 
“introspective empiricism,” as it was referred to in the literature. The exclusive focus of 
Brentano’s doctrine is inner experience, on which ground it is arguably the only scientific 
psychology that can also serve as a basal science for aesthetics, logic, pedagogy, ethics, and 
politics. The latter disciplines all prove mutually consistent, indeed orientationally 
complementary if approached from the standpoint of Brentano’s introspective empiricism. By 
contrast, he found that such consistency fails to obtain if one regards them from the stance of 
metaphysics, which the logical positivists would later dismiss as “pseudo-science.”  
  Like Frege’s revolutionary advances in logic, Brentano’s novel “empirical 
psychology” made it possible to fix the basic laws of his science with “the same sharpness and 
precision as the axioms of mathematics” (1874, 67). Brentano conceived his doctrine as “the 
science of the future [...] that would allow a significant influence on practical life” (36). He 
was convinced, moreover, as was Frege, that there is only one Truth and only a single “realm 
of truth” (5). That philosophy developed itself as an independent discipline so late historically 
is something he attributed simply to the fact that the elements of philosophy are signally more 
complex than the defining moments of the other sciences—including the elements, or 
“objects,” of such exact sciences as physics and mathematics.   
  It should be clear by now that, given the evidence, the mutually commensurate 
innovations of Brentano and Frege are historically and philosophically pivotal outgrowths of 
Hermann Lotze’s philosophy.27 Brentano himself perhaps best spelled out what underlies 
Lotze’s formative influence, namely   
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 In § 3.3 we shortly discussed the parallel and independent influence of Lotze on Brentano’s and on Frege’s 
conception of intentionality. 
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the method of his way of doing philosophy, the weight that he places upon experience and 
observation, the manner in which he uses the results of natural science, the caution and 
conscientiousness with which he makes his claims. (Kaiser-el-Safti 2014, 2, November 3, 
1867)  
  
4.2. Lotze and Brentano: similarity of philosophical approach  
  Most current students of Brentano, indeed of the history of twentieth-century 
philosophy at large, are either unaware of or have failed to credit the cumulative significance 
of the evidence developed in the foregoing pages. The import of these historically 
substantiated reflections is patently clear when one considers in more general terms the 
striking similarities of approach in the philosophies of Lotze and Brentano. In the century 
since Brentano’s death, his thought has had a growing impact on major currents of Western 
philosophy. After decades of unwarranted neglect in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, his works ultimately received their due recognition and have inspired generations of 
phenomenologists and new ontologists. Oddly enough, for many years during Brentano’s 
lifetime (he died in 1917) philosophical debate centered on the work of his students—Edmund 
Husserl, Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, Kazimierz Twardowski, and Anton Marty—while 
virtually ignoring Brentano himself, the founding father of the new philosophical movement. 
“Brentano puzzle” and the “Brentano Invisibility” are how later historians of philosophy 
would refer to the unaccountable marginalization or absence of Brentano’s name in the 
leading studies of the time.
28
 
  If anything, such neglect was to prove even more egregious in the case of Lotze, 
whom John Passmore aptly described as the “most pillaged philosopher” in twentieth-century 
speculative thought.
29
 A factor that must be laid at Lotze’s own feet is at least partially 
responsible for his long relegation largely to the margins in the literature down our own day. 
The issue is Lotze’s own attitude toward how he wished his philosophical contributions to be 
exploited by those who found inspiration in his works. So far as his original ideas and trains 
of thought have been “pillaged,” this can be seen as consistent with Lotze’s wishes as 
famously expressed in the Preface to his “greater” Logic (1874): “One must regard it [my 
work] as an open market, on which one quietly leaves the goods of less interest by side” 
                                                 
28
 Cf. Poli 1998, 1. 
29
 See Passmore 1966, 51.  
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(1989, 4*). This attitude reflects nothing so much as Lotze’s revolutionary break with the 
encyclopedic,
30
 cosmic systematicity that, culminating with the classic German Idealists, till 
his day held sway as the regulative idea of serious philosophical thought.    
  Lotze struck out metaphysically in a radically new direction by analyzing 
philosophical problems on a “piecemeal” basis. Consequently, he addressed the aporiai to 
which he devoted his theoretical energies each on its own grounds and not, as had been the 
practice of the leading German philosophers, by approaching it on the basis of its formal 
relation to the solution of other philosophical issues. As Passmore rightly discerned, “it was 
precisely his lack of system on which his influence depended.”31   
 The same holds true for Franz Brentano. Like Lotze, Brentano   
  
wrote no philosophical system. He discussed certain fundamental problems [of 
philosophy], just as the scientists contribute to the slowly developing science, by making 




5. Differences between Lotze and Brentano  
  Despite the highly significant points of convergence with Lotze that we’ve reviewed, 
Brentano was without question an independent thinker. And this notwithstanding the 
methodological parallels that further evidence to the shaping influence that Lotze’s 
philosophical work had on the younger man. Brentano’s independence of mind is 
unmistakable in the explicit criticism that he leveled at Lotze. What must count as among the 
most hard-hitting examples occurs in the letter previously cited (in n. 3, above), of March 3, 
1867:  
  
I am far from approving [Lotze’s] opinions throughout. [He is] too much influenced with 
Kant’s criticism. ... That he does not know the [philosophy of the] Middle Ages and 
                                                 
30
 Cf. Milkov (2015b).  
31
 See Passmore (1966, 51). This method would be adopted by Bertrand Russell, who referred to it as 
“piecemeal” philosophy (see Russell 1918, 85). Russell insisted, however, that only by means of such a 
methodology could philosophy develop as a strict science. For an account of Lotze’s influence on Russell, see 
Milkov (2008).  
32
 Puglisi (1913, 16–17); cited in Poli (1998, 3f.).  
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therefore does not appreciate it, cannot be a surprise to you. It also seems to me that he has 
very limited knowledge of the ancient philosophy. (Kaiser-el-Safti 2014, 2)  
  
  Two of the more specific objections that Brentano raised against Lotze target the 
latter’s “local signs” theory of perception and his “atomism.” Brentano dismissed these as 
constructivist doctrines and hence as, in his view, retrogressively Kantian. At any rate, 
Lotze’s atomism and his doctrine of local signs are in no way descriptive, and on that count 
they are epistemologically antithetical to Brentano’s “nativist” psychology. Moreover, 
Brentano’s radical form of “nativism,” according to which mental phenomena are innate, 
made him leery of Lotze’s advocacy of experimental investigations in psychology. Tellingly, 
it was precisely on these grounds that Brentano would ultimately find himself at cross 
purposes with his student Carl Stumpf, who undertook to combine nativist psychology with 
experimental psychology. Needless to say, Stumpf’s venture left Brentano cold. Be this as it 
may, Stumpf became a champion of experimental psychology under the influence of the 
mentor whom he came to revere as his “fatherly advisor,” Lotze.33   
  More generally, Brentano repudiated what he detected as lingering elements of 
German idealism in Lotze. One such holdover that struck him as particularly unacceptable is 
Lotze’s principle of “teleomechanism.” Brentano found it exasperating that “in spite of all 
sciences” Lotze failed “to overcome even the Hegel disease.”34 He complained, moreover, 
that while Lotze’s writings commence along promising and compelling lines they often trail 
off “in a most foggy swindle”; he found it a pity that in Lotze, over and over again, 
“something [that] begins so sober, ends so drunken and hypnagogically blurred” (ibid.).   
 Not surprisingly, Brentano also rejected Lotze’s tripartite classification of mental 
phenomena into imagination, emotional excitement, and striving (will), which he adopted 
from Kant.
35
 This taxonomy Brentano found hopelessly abstract, objecting that not only does 
it fail to credit the differences between diverse phenomena but in addition, and more 
fundamentally, it fails to discriminate the different ways that the mind refers to its objects. 
Brentano, for his part, divided mental phenomena into ideas, judgments, and emotions (the 
phenomena of hate and love).
36
  
                                                 
33
 A fact introduced into the contemporary literature on the topic by the present writer: Milkov (2015a).  
34
 Letter to Stumpf, February 15, 1868 (1989, 7f.). 
35
 1924b, 22. Brentano mistakenly assumed that Lotze inherited this classification from William Hamilton.  
36
 Ibid., 33. 
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  The foregoing divergences in the philosophical doctrines of Lotze and Brentano were 
accompanied by differences of a more personal sort. Brentano was a dogmatic thinker, an 
individual with a defensive cast of mind who was little receptive to criticism, even that 
offered most temperately by his closest students. Lotze by contrast was exceedingly diffident 
for a leading German philosopher of his day. Indeed, he was open-minded to a fault and 
genuinely open to the views of others, including those of his students who boldly criticized his 
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 The author presented an earlier draft of this essay in German, on May 20, 2017, in Bautzen, Germany, at the 
workshop “Denken im Zwiespalt – Zum 200. Geburtstag des Philosophen Rudolph Hermann Lotze.” Thanks are 
due to the workshop participants who offered a number of critical observations that led to the material 
improvements incorporated in the present version of the essay. Special thanks go to Phillip Stambovsky (New 
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